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panied by a rational theory which will reduce the occurrences to
that order which all men feel sure is uniform in the cosmos.
Herein, then, rest our hope and the duty of our scientific lead-

Conservative savants yet hold aloof, but even they are beThe evidence of something, of something

ers.

ginning- to take notice.

which

cries out for study,

for science

much

is

becoming too copious and challenging
it by
and upon the decision of

longer to pass

;

science in this field rests the possibility, as

Myers long ago pointed

our being able to accept the Resurrection and with it a
re-born Christianity. If science declares that spirits have appeared
to mortals, indeed that they are appearing even now, then we can

out, of

put credence in Paul's solemn asseveration that Jesus appeared "to

our best, nay more,
Thousands in every
these sad times of death have found consolation and hope

This

Peter, to the Twelve, to myself also."

our only hope
land in

;

and by no means

is it

is

slender.

renewed, not in the age-old story of a corpse that revived, but in

observed this day at their own
dead do live again. Thus may bloom
once more a purified and enduring faith in the Resurrection and

what seems

fireside,

to

them

real evidence,

that their beloved

the Life.

THE CYCLE OF LAW.
BY HOMER HOYT.

THEwide

quest for legal justice leads to

as

as the poles asunder.

One

two

principles, apparently

principle states that unlimited

—

freedom to decide each case upon its merits according to equity
and conscience is indispensible to justice, while the other principle
just as positively proclaims that unlimited freedom to decide cases
according to equity and conscience leads to the abuses of the Star
Chamber and the Third Degree. One principle decries the rule

—

of precedent as the source of injustice, the other principle lauds
as the very fountain of justice.

Thus do the

oracles of justice

it

seem

and cause laymen to believe that the legal
at the same breath.
The paradox set forth is no figment of the imagination but a real
problem in the growth of law. The opposing principles of justice
according to an iron standard and justice according to conscience
mark the extreme points between which the law has fluctuated in
the course of its development.
The Cycle of Lazu embraces the
period in which the law has started from a system in which one

to contradict each other

system blows hot and cold
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of these principles dominated, has gradually changed to a system
in

which the opposite principle held mastery, and has

finally

come

back again to a condition similar to the starting-point. It is the
purpose of this paper to describe this cycle in very briefest compass,
to indicate the fundamental forces that have moved through the

maze of decisions, statutes, constitutions, codes constituting the
outward barometer of the law, to give a hasty glimpse at the general
trend of centuries of legal history, omitting from view the vast
minutiae of special rules so vital to the individual case, passing
swiftly by whole subjects of substantive law, and the entire science

of pleading in order that the general contour of the legal

stand forth in clear

There

woods may

relief.

no inevitable beginning nor end to such a study,, nor is
whose laws have prior claim to such a
is probable that tablets of laws that crumbled to dust

is

there any chosen people

survey.

It

before the Code of

Hammurabi

or the

Roman Laws

of the

Twelve

Tables have gone through a process of development similar to that
about to be described, but it is needless to search in the ashes of

Assyrian

cities

when evidence
tells

for the

judgment

rolls

of a forgotten civilization,

written in bold type in the year-books of

Edward I
we

us the story of the genesis of the very laws under which

are living to-day.

The theory

of the cycle of law will accordingly

be illustrated by the development of the American
rather,

its

common law

or,

English prototype.

In describing a continuous process that winds back to a place
similar to a preceding phase in

ence where a start
at that

is

made.

course,

its

It will

phase of the cycle that

it

makes no

vital differ-

be convenient, however, to begin

is

characterized by stability and

respect for precedent, because a legal system that has crystallized
into a definite

form presents

a tangible substance for analysis

and

the record of judgments or stone tablets to chronicle the finality

A period of static equilibrium was attained
its achievement.
by the English law by the end of the thirteenth century. By that
time the reaction between the frontier justice of the Anglo-Saxons
and the refined law of the Normans had produced one fairly homogeneous system of English law the blood feud, the wager of battle,
and rough-and-ready methods of self-help had been partly eliminated
and partly disciplined by technical procedure scattered local customs, opposing traditions had become merged into the King's justice
administered by the King's courts and the young legal system had
grown until its height was measured by its 471 writs and it no
longer possessed the power to add another writ to its stature.
of

;

;

;
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which has been arbitrarily selected
had emerged from the unstable
period of growth during which its form and content hung in a
balance of principles and customs it had reached the age of assimilation, analysis and codification.
The characteristics of a legal
system that had arrived at years of maturity could be read in the
cycle

as a starting-point, the English law

;

respect for precedent, the technical rules of pleading, the formality

of writs, the dignity and solemnity of judicial procedure, the

pom-

pous Latin phrases incomprehensible to laymen, the fees and delays
of court trials, the rise of a professional class of lawyers and the
codification of the law

At

by Bracton.

that time in

its life

history,

the law delighted to wield the new-found powers that arose out of

and parchment, writ and oath. It demanded the strict obform rather than an inquiry into the fundamental
merits of the case; inclining its judgment scales in favor of the
debtor when he could successfully pass the prescribed ritual by
producing eleven neighbors to swear he did not owe the money, and
inclining its scales in favor of the creditor when one false move on
the part of the debtor or his aids
a mispronounced word or the
lowering of an arm before the proper time broke the charm of
the elaborate symbolism.
Thus the static law brought order and
respect for authority out of the chaos of Anglo-Saxon law at the
expense of equity and conscience.
The movement away from the static equilibrium like all organic movements grew out of the very conditions of stability. The
crystallization of causes of action into 471 specific forms had practically closed legal machinery to new causes of action, because as
these various forms became related to each other by a net-work of
logical analysis so that they grew into an organic whole, it became
more and more difficult to graft an alien on to the existing system.
The forces of habit, tradition and inertia under the guidance of
clerks and lawyers schooled in the prevailing forms also tended to
keep the law within its accustomed channels. While the law was
thus steeling itself against change through external pressure, the
power of forces of change was rapidly increasing. Even in the
customary society of the thirteenth century some new legal situations
would unavoidably arise out of the permutations and combinations
of social dealings, but when the Black Death and the Peasants'
Revolt produced great upheavals in the quiet flow of English life,
the number of adjustments not provided for by the old legal system
was bound to increase at a progressive rate.
seal

servance of

—

—

—

—

The

first

external evidence of a

movement awav from

a condi-
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was noted by the statute of Westminster II (A. D.
which provided authority for new remedies to meet new
causes of action. This was only a partial solution of the problem,
however, for the statute was directed against well-established habits
and interpreted by hostile judiciary so that its actual purpose was
limited to such narrow ground that it was almost made nugatory.
The increasing inflexibility of law as contrasted with the growing
needs of the times forced some changes by underground channels.
When a change was camouflaged in an elaborate fiction, the pride
of technicality was either appeased or the blind side of the judges
tion of fixity

1285)

successfully approached, for

the

no

common law
title

by the

many changes

disguised under old forms.

crept into the fold of

The requirement

that

deed was avoided
allowed claimants of land by adverse

to land could be transferred without a

grant

fiction of lost

—wherein

—

would brazenly allege that a deed
had been granted to a remote ancestor, but that it had been lost.
The court would wink at these and many other subterfuges of like
nature, and by refusing to allow any investigation of their truth

possession

the litigant

new rule of law. Thus the common law
and technical as society receded from it.
The rigor of the common law finally forced another system to
spring up side by side with it a system which embodied the contrary principle of jurisprudence, namely the decision of each case
on its merits. The pressure of suitors unsatisfied by a system of
common law that had now become decadent forced the development
of a court of chancery or equity which sought without reference
to precedent or form to achieve substantial justice between the
parties.
The court of equity was established by the king under the
authority of his undistributed reserve power to decide cases when
the common law courts could not afford relief.
The new equity
courts had jurisdiction of the person, their orders were binding
on the conscience and could be enforced by jail sentences. Their
power was not limited to existing forms but they could devise any
new remedy to meet any new situation, and their decrees were binding on even the common law courts, for they could enjoin any
judgment which was against their ideas of justice. The common law
courts continued in existence without interruption, and handed out
decisions based on precedents the same as before, but they were
now subject to the control of another court which could set them at
defiance when a proper case for equity arose.
The anomaly so
hard for a layman to understand of two systems of law, common
law and equity, administered in the same place over the same
practically inaugurate a

became more

artificial

—

—

—
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subject-matter sometimes by different courts and sometimes by the

same court or the same man

sitting on the same bench, thus crept
system because of the inevitable antagonism between
the two fundamental principles mentioned in the opening paragraph.
The common law, however, could not remain shut up in an

into

our

air-tight

legal

compartment when confronted by equity. The common
it to their self-interest and to the self-interest
science to moderate the fixity of the common law in order

law judges found
of their
to

extend their jurisdiction before equity arrived. Consequently a
common law and the chancery courts to

race began between the

The whole equiwas developed by the common law
under the spur of the competition with equity. Thus the interaction
between equity and the common law finally produced a situation
in which far more attention was paid to deciding cases on their
liberalize their

views and to grant new remedies.

table doctrine of cpasi-contracts

merits than ever before.
the half of the cycle

By

the time of the seventeenth century,

was completed and law was

at its greatest

period of flux.

From

this

high water

mark

of justice according to conscience,

unimpeded by precedent, the law again returned to a static equilibrium.
Again the retrograde movement began while the very
reign of equity was at its height.
Complaints began to be made
that the Court of Equity enjoyed complete freedom from any
salutary control, and that decisions according to conscience varied
with the conscience of each Chancellor which varied, as was later
said by Selden, with the length of the foot of each Chancellor.

The

decisions of the Chancery Courts

were unwritten, and no attempt
was made to consult or follow precedent, the Court of Chancery
being similar in this respect to the notorious Star Chamber. While
complaints against the uncertain and capricious nature of equity
were thus being made, equity was more or less unconsciously imitating many common law forms and among them a leaning toward
precedents. Gradually equity crystallized into a definite form just
as the common law had before it, the chancery cases were printed
and acquired binding authority as precedents just as the common
law cases had become binding. Equity, while not so formal as the
common law, finally described its metes and bounds with the same
care as the common law, and the conscience of the chancellor ceased
to be the varying moral ideals of individuals and became the incorporated conscience of generations of chancellors. Thus equity
in turn became closed to new forces and reached maturity.
In the
meantime by a process of judicial legislation under Lord Mansfield.

—
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the

common law had

assimilated the

Law Merchant which

long time existed as an exotic system, unrecognized by the
law.

Thus renovated and

enlarged, the combined system of

for a

common
common

law and equity by the middle of the eighteenth century again reached
a static equilibrium and a complete cycle had been transcribed.

The

which succeeded the long period which spanned the
and the eighteenth centuries has proceeded much more
the period of static equirapidly. After an interval of quiescence
librium in which precedent and custom held the throne lasting in
England to the middle of the nineteenth century and in America
to the beginning of the twentieth century, the complete swing of
the pendulum from stability to equity covering half the cycle
was made in a few decades. Discontent with the fundamental
assumptions of law elaborated after five hundred years of painstaking effort was precipitated by the industrial revolution which
suddenly showered titanic changes upon society so as to disrupt
old relationships and to usher in new legal problems in ever increasing
cycle

thirteenth

—

—

—

numbers.

The common

law, adjusted to pre-revolution times, could

not keep pace, even by judicial legislation and the twisting of old

with the demands created by the presence of machinery,
widening markets, the growth of cities, large-scale production, trade
unions, and the woman's movement. In the nineteenth century, the
return to the principles of justice according to equity and conscience
began through legislation and the movement rapidly gained in volume

rules,

—

and intensity until by the early part of the twentieth century in
the present day
the flood of statutes has probably reached its high
water mark. In the course of this "rain" of statutes, even the equity

—

courts themselves, the original

fountains of justice according to

were thoroughly renovated and purged of the accumulations
of precedent which prevented them from fulfilling their particular
function, and new administrative bodies with wide discretionary
powers were created to supply the needed elasticity in our legal
system. At last, however, the career of statute-law which has almost become an epidemic seems to have reached its zenith, and
after the wildest experiments in legislature, we seem now ready
Already some
to return to more stable and scientific standards.
legislators are beginning to recognize that their power is not omnipotent, and that there is a limit to the good that can be accomplished
by a mere fiat and this is a sure sign that we are receding from
naive confidence in our ability to fly to the social paradise by passing
It is probable, however, that we shall not return to another
a law.
merit,

—
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?

equilibrium without a thoroughgoing reconstruction of the

static

fundamental premises which underlie present legal theory.
The moral told by the Cycle of Law is probably unwelcome to
the reformers who hope to bring about the social millennium by
a single stroke of legislation, for a common law that has withstood
the shocks of equity reform and the deluge of statutes and codes
undoubtedly has

On

storms.

sufficient

toughness to meet the strain of future

the other hand, since the longevity of the

common law

bend under
moral can
afford but little comfort to the reactionaries who expect to keep
an iron lid pressed down upon forces of change. In the far-reaching
panorama of legal history that has been flashed before the reader,
all the apparent contradictory elements in law appear as part of
one great movement. Statutes, equity, judicial legislation, are the
methods by which the law grows and expands, while common law
decisions, and constitutions are the ways in which the new growth
Thus the law grows like a sturdy
is assimilated to the old system.
oak, adding successive rings of sap to the inner heart wood until
it develops strength and stability without losing its capactiy to add
new branches and to stimulate the flow of sap that keeps the whole
organism alive.
Law attains its golden mean when it supplies a remedy for
has been due to the fact that
a weight that

its

elasticity

would have crushed a

permitted

when

it

represses

and unstable conditions with one hand and dispenses new

theories of justice to
it

to

rigid substance, the

every injury while adhering to stable principles,
violence

it

fit

new

conditions with the other, in short

coincides with the predominant aspirations of society

uniting the opposing principles of stability and equity.
fluctuates

above and below

this

when

by happily

The law

golden mean, the magnitude of the

when society is in a state of flux and small
bound by custom, but whether the deviations are
or small the law tends ever to seek its level despite the dams

oscillations being great

when

society

large

is

interposed by legislatures or courts.

''ARE

YOU GOING BACK TO JERUSALEM?"
BY CHARLES CLEVELAND COHAN.

ON

the very day that the

word came

flashing along of General

met a Christian friend of mine
who greeted me with the words, "Well, the Holy City has been
delivered from the Turks. Are you going back to Jerusalem?"
I merely smiled at him and remarked that considering the fact
Allenby's capture of Jerusalem

I

